The Origin of Judgment :: Judgment Edmund Husserl Essays

The Origin of JudgmentIntroductionThe guiding thesis of scram and Judgment is that logic demands a foundational theory of experience, which at the lowest train is described as prepredicative or prelinguistic.1 Edmund Husserl pursues within that text a phenomenological elucidation of the origin of supposition in order that he might elucidate the essence of the predicative judgment. He does so in the belief that an probe into the form of prepredicative experience will show it to be the ground of the social organization of predicative thought, and thus the origin of general, conceptual thought.From the beginning, Husserl takes the tangled of logic as being two-fold on the iodin hand there is the question of the war paint of forms of judgment and their laws and on the other, that of the subjective conditions of the attainment of self-evidence.2 He egests his investigation into this problematic in Experience and Judgment a tri fortuneite construction, with each part correspond ing to a different level of experience. This paper will generally mirror Husserls own division, beginning with an articulation of what Husserl means by the prepredicative domain of experience. This will be followed by an examination of the origins of judgment in the prepredicative realm. Finally it will address simple predicative judgment and give a cursory treatment of the manner in which Husserl sees such judgment as progressing toward knowledge and universal judgment. All of this will be preceded, however, by a brief introduction to the arguments of Experience and Judgment. In Part I of Experience and Judgment, Husserl proceeds with an analysis of the passive data of experience. It is here that Husserl hopes to confront what he refers to as the prepredicative conditions of predication as such. These prepredicative conditions underlie every displace of objective experience, such that these structures ultimately found the distinct forms of judgment that one would encounter on th e level of formal logic. Part II concerns the structure of predicative thought as such that is, it is concerned with the origin of predicative forms of judgment in prepredicative experience. Husserl argues that on the level of predicative thought, objectivities of understanding argon realized in acts of categorical judgment, which form the logical structures necessary to the launch of a formal logic. The origin of general, conceptual thought is treated in Part III. The process of isolating the forms of judgment from the data of pregiven subjective experience, begun in Part II, is here continued.